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CHRISTIAN THEORIES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
ThOimAS L. SHAFFER*
Consideration of the religious and moral significance of legal prac-
tice is a subject to which too little attention has been paid in Ameri-
can legal education. Louis M. Brown has been one of those few en-
gaged in the teaching of law who has explored the ethical components
of lawyering; his example has been a great influence on many of us.
It seems appropriate, therefore, in this tribute to Louis M. Brown, to
consider the role which Christian values may play in producing lawyers
who are well-developed in interpersonal as in professional skills.
It is possible that these reflections will advance religious discus-
sion among lawyers, an effect which would do appropriate honor to a
legal educator who is as dedicated as anyone to a profession made up
of good persons. This little project might then end up making things
better. But my motives are not reform; rather, the essay manifests a
personal quest which Louis Brown will, I think, understand, because
he knows of his own quest. He inspires more than he realizes by being
loyal to it.
The fostering of ethical and religious concern among lawyers
might be thought to be a task which belonged, long ago, to those who
founded, maintained, and taught in Christian university law schools.
But most of the law faculties at what were once thought to be the great
Protestant Christian universities appear uninterested in their institu-
tional heritage, if not ashamed of it.1 Law faculties in Roman Catholic
* Dean, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1958, University of Albuquerque; J.D.
1961, Notre Dame. I am grateful to my colleagues, Professors Robert E. Rodes, Jr.,
Stanley Hauerwas, and Morton Kelsey for valuable advice and encouragement.
1. The new law school at Brigham Young University should be excepted from
this observation. It is not a Protestant institution, but the reason for special treatment
is not merely sectarian precision: the founding principles in that law school have been
thoughtful, recent, and advertently religious, its beginning being attributed by its found-
ers to specific divine direction. Its Christian religious witness remains to be experi-
enced,
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universities have rarely passed beyond fruitless phrases about natural
law, which long ago became a banner rather than an idea, and is now
neither banner nor idea.2  There are few who have stubbornly and ac-
tively sought to retain the Christian character and heritage in teaching
law.' Although Catholic lawyers and law students are frequently
reminded that the poor must be fed and the persecuted delivered from
their chains, most of our students and graduates, like most Christians
in the American legal profession, remain committed to the defense of
power and wealth.4  Such legal assistance to the poor and powerless as
has been provided arises from agnostic roots.5 Christianity has had too
little to do with what is hopeful in the American legal profession. I
believe that a motivating reason for that failure is our diffidence in talk-
ing about religious commitment; when few talk about religion, personal
value is inaccessible and public style becomes irreligious. Too many
candles are under too many bushels.6
This essay will seek to relate Christian values to the American
legal profession's most recent statement of ethical aspiration, the Code
of Professional Responsibility.7 In examining this relationship, four
canons seem appropriate-those dealing with personal relationship,8
2. The problem of natural law as a religious idea is that it began to produce too
few of what James might have called fruits for living, although it was often seen as a
general inspiration for hard judicial or professional choices. See O'Meara, Natural Law
and Everyday Law, 5 NATURAL LAw FORUM 83 (1960). The result was that natural
law jurisprudence became a philosopher's euphemism for dogma. It might better have
been called by its right name but for the fact that Catholic lawyers felt a need for some
bit of professional theology of their own. The natural law tradition's most useful idea-
that law has to take account of the way people are-tended to ignore any empirical base
and even to discourage Aquinas-like (or Jung-like) introspection. I think the central
idea remains useful, but the time has come when it does more harm than good to call
it "natural law."
3. Report of the Committee on University Priorities, NOTRE DAME MAOAZINE,
December 1973. See Shaffer, Report of the Dean 1971-72, 48 NOTaE DAME LAW.
232, 233 (1972); Shaffer, Report of the Dean 1972-73, 49 NoTRE DAME LAw. 214
(1973). See also Shaffer, On Making Lawyers More Human, Tn STuDENT LAw., Sep-
tember 1972, at 16.
4. See Powledge, Something For A Lawyer to Do, THE NEW YORKER, October 25,
1969, at 63 et seq. [hereinafter cited as Powledge].
5. See id.; Interview with Michael Tigar in A Lawyer for Social Change, THE
CENTER MAGAZINE, November-December 1971, at 27-35.
6. See Matthew 25:15-16.
7. Am RcAN BAR ASS'N CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLITY (1969) [herein-
after cited as CODE; references to Ethical Considerations will be abbreviated "E.C.,"
to Disciplinary Rules "D.R."'.
8, Id. -Cfngon Foulr,
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professional zeal,9 reform,10 and example." For both Christian and
non-Christian lawyers, it is my hope that this Article will encourage
the humanistic lawyering which Louis Brown celebrates in his life and
his work.
I. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
Jesus' teaching about personal relationship was radical, uncompromis-
ing, and fearful:
The only place one can find the Father is in one's brother, and in
the transaction of goods and services which will help that brother to
become nourished and to grow.12
Christianity demands a posture toward other persons which resists the
confines of rules-not so much because it wants to be free of rules,
but because rules cannot contain it. A Christian who happens to be
a lawyer-or a lawyer who proposes to be a Christian-is told to meet
those with whom he has personal relationships in the spirit St. Paul in-
voked when he addressed the Christians in Corinth:
We need no letters of recommendation either to you or from you,
because you are yourselves our letter, written in our hearts, that
anybody can see and read, ,and it is plain that you are a letter from
Christ, drawn up by us, and written not with ink but with the Spirit
of the living God, not on stone tablets but on ,the tablets of your
living hearts.' 3
These demands cannot be codified, but they may be applied to
a lawyer's life in suggestive, exemplar, and specific ways. Canon Four 4
is such an application. The professional duty to respect confidences,
expresses both a traditionally religious and a psychologically sophisti-
cated social value. There is a strong secular ethic-patent human-
ism-in the underpinnings of the principle; it goes to the heart of the
professional relationship and to the soul of lawyering as a worthy en-
deavor. The State, in its judicial robes, has decided that confidential
9. Id. Canon Seven.
10. Id. Canon Eight.
11. Id. Canon Nine.
12. 1. BURTCHAELL, PHILEMON'S PROBLEM: THE DAILY DILEMMA OF THB Cmus-
TIAN 47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BURTCHAELL]; see Matthew 25:31-46.
13. St. Paul's Second Letter to the Christians in Corinth, 2 Corinthians 3:1-3.
14. CODE, supra note 7, Canon Four: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confi-
dences and Secrets of a Client."
15, ,S'ee C. MCoRMIc K, EviDEN~c & 79 (2d ed. 1972).
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counsel is more valuable than the discovery of truth. The evidentiary
privilege enjoyed by a lawyer's client is the broadest of all eviden-
tiary privileges and Canon Four makes it clear that the lawyer's duty
to respect confidence is even broader than the privilege.
Suppose a man comes to me seeking divorce, and I discover that
he has not lived in the state long enough to meet statutory residence
requirements. I explain that he may not have a divorce-at least not
yet-and he leaves in a huff. Consider the following situations:
(1) I learn later that he has seen another lawyer and suspect that,
having learned a recondite bit of law from me, he has lied
about residence to the other lawyer.
(2) I learn that the other lawyer has filed a petition for divorce
on this client's behalf, -and I know that the client has lied to
the lawyer or that -they have 'both lied -to the court.
(3) I learn that the client has been brought to trial for perjury
and that my testimony would be useful to the prosecution.
In none of these three cases may I say what I know-not to prevent
the abuse of my brother or sister lawyer; not to prevent a fraud on the
court; not to assist in the administration of criminal justice. None of
these reasons is as important to the State-to the law-as is my silence.
Every secular theory I can think of to explain this social prefer-
ence seems somehow inadequate. The theories I have in mind can
be summed up in three brief paragraphs.
First, the State may recognize that people need people. There
is something about human beings, in their emotional need of one an-
other, that the State cannot supplant or for which it can find no substi-
tute. The best thing for the State to do is to respect the need, and to
respect what people do in response to the need. My divorce client
might have needed me, and I was obliged to be available to his need.
A relationship between two people becomes a third personality.' And
that third personality, so this first theory suggests, is beyond the power
of the State, immune to the blunt instruments of government.
Second, the State has found a usefulness it decides to respect in
the narrower relationship between a person who is suffering and a per-
son who proposes to be helpful in easing the pain. There is social util-
16. This truth was taught by Aquinas and later discovered by Jung. See T. SHAI-
'PR, DEATH, PRQPERTY, AND LAwYvE g. 7 (1970) [hetvinafter Oited gs HIAFnR].
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ity in the "helping person" relationship. Just as a religiously-neutral
government accords respect to religious schools because of their value
to the secular good, respect is accorded "helping person" relationships
because of their social utility.
Third, it is socially useful that human difficulties be resolved in
the arena which involves the fewest people and the least social machin-
ery. Aspirations aside, this is a principle of secular economy. A
Christian who specially adheres to St. Paul's injunction against repair-
ing to the courts saves the State time and money, as does a Jew who
takes his quarrel to the rabbi. For example, the State has respected
the dispute-settlement apparatus within a family by affording intra-fam-
ily immunity in tort.17  There is social value in mediation and concilia-
tion, and therefore in whatever machinery for reconciliation men
invent. The professional interaction between lawyer and client is one
such mediating relationship.
Any of these three theories could provide justification for a para-
phrasing of Canon Four: our duty not to speak of what our clients
tell us is as broad as the need which brings people to us. This duty
has social value; our function as professionals depends on it, because
our function as professionals requires that we learn the truth as often
as we can. Because our social function is valuable, the means we must
have to perform it well are also valuable. I reflect, for example, on
cases in which I have represented indigent criminal defendants and
prisoners in the Indiana State Prison. My recurrent problem has been
to convince the client in that situation that I am on his side. He sees
me as part of the machinery which put him behind bars. He tells me
what he thinks the judge wants to hear. Canon Four seeks to provide
lawyers with the means to encourage free and truthful communication,
whenever possible.
Although theories of social utility thus may seem to be sufficient
to explain Canon Four, they cannot provide the moral foundation for
lawyering that this Article seeks to explore. Secular inspiration usually
is thought to be adequate justification for any phenomenon because
Americans tend to abandon rationale once social utility is served. One
17. See Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 316, 211 A.2d 410, 413 (1965). Intra-
family immunity is only now breaking down as it becomes apparent that its family-har-
mony purpose is no longer served. There is a line of New Hampshire cases which at-
tempted to balance this traditional respect for internal government in the family against
the fact that modem liability insurance practices have made some family disputes en-
tirely fictin al, See cases cited in id,
1975]
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feels the need, however, to seek out the moral value in confidentiality,
even if the State doesn't need moral reasons, or doesn't think it does.
A moral reason for confidentiality may be professionally important, be-
cause the Code tells lawyers that their duty is not summed up in the
rule of evidence which prevents testimony about what a client says.18
Consideration of a Christian theory of the lawyer-client relationship,
therefore, might provide a perspective on this moral dimension of legal
practice.
A Christian justification of confidential relationships will likely
start with an approach relating to the Christian theory of human per-
sonality, which sees man and woman as children of God. This moral
justification for confidentiality is a theological justification; another hu-
man person is an unfathomable mystery, indivisible, and infinitely valu-
able. One's entry into the hidden comers of another person's life is
a sacred entry into what must always remain unknown. The teachings
of Jesus assure Christians that God comes to us in other people, includ-
ing clients.
This teaching leads to several observations that might help one
recognize the moral ramifications of the lawyer-client relationship.
One observation is that the expression of the human need which brings
a person to a lawyer is often an incidental product of the client's per-
ception of what the professional is good at doing. For instance, people
in business may tend to go to lawyers with the problems which send
non-business people to doctors or clergymen. A person in need tends
to define his difficulty in terms of the helper's expertise. The same
person may tell an internist he has stomach-aches, a psychiatrist he is
nervous, a clergyman he is guilty, and then talk to a lawyer about exe-
cuting a new will,' 9 all in connection with the same problem. The les-
18. See CODE, supra note 7, E.C. 4-1.
19. Church, People Come to Lawyers Wanting a Good Parent, Magical Body-
guard, and Political Ally with Muscle, THE STUDENT LAw., December 1973, at 10.
The fact that a client first seeks you, an attorney, rather than a minister, mar-
riage counselor, psychologist, therapist, or doctor, may have little to do with
the nature of his underlying problem (or even with the best means of effec-
tively resolving it). More likely, he will choose a lawyer because of his stereo-
types of the other helping professions in relation to his self image, or his view
of the lawyer as an authoritative, rational, and respected power source.
Dr. Church's view is not exactly the one I advance here, but is one I respect and one
which has been considered by Louis Brown and Robert S. Redmount. See Redmount,
Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REv. 98 (1969); Marriage
Problems, Intervention, and the Legal Professional (manuscript). See also C.A. Wisn,
PASTORAL COUNSELING: ITS TlEoRy AND PRAcncE (1951) [hereinafter cited as Wise].
I have been guided at several points in this essay, including this one, by Professor Mor-
ton Kelsey's lecture notes on pastoral counseling [hereinafter cited as Kelsey].
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son in this curious fact is not that clients are childish; it is that those
of us who propose to help people as a profession have divided ourselves
into recondite subspecialities and then have built walls to separate us
from one another. We have deluded ourselves into supposing that our
specialties have reality. The talent called for in helping someone in
pain is the same talent whether it is present in a physician, therapist,
social worker, clergyman, or lawyer. In each situation the client re-
sponds to a sign of hope in his need. Both the sign and the response
are more interpersonal than our professional trade-union rules admit.
The client's choice of professional is then the incidental effect of an
interpersonal moment. He chooses the lawyer as a person, not just as
a professional. The appropriate response to the client therefore must
be a reciprocal personal choice. That response requires an interest in
him which is greater-and more manifest-than interest in his ideas,
his problems, or the professional challenge he presents to the lawyer.
The skill I need, before I can begin to use my lawyer skills, is
what Morton Kelsey calls approachability.20 A client who comes to me
when he might as well have gone to his pastor or to a psychologist
may be responding to something in me which has little to do with my
being a lawyer. It is that something-my approachability-on which
I might usefully seek to build my relationship with him.2'
Another observation is that the relationship of lawyer and client
produces legal decisions. Most legal decisions are made outside of
courts; many are made in lawyers' offices. A decision made in a law-
yer's office is as fully a legal decision as if it were made by a judge.
In fact, a law-office decision will probably affect the life of the client
who makes it more than any decision of any court. Moreover, such
a decision can have far-reaching effects on other people: the will
of a patriarch, the collective-bargaining agreement between the
United Auto Workers and General Motors Corporation, or a loan
agreement which will finance housing for hundreds of thousands of
people can have wide-spread social repercussions."2
20. Kelsey, supra note 19:
When men try to get hold of the secret of your life, no friendship, no kindli-
ness, can make you show it to them unless they evidently feel as you feel that
it is a serious and sacred thing. There must be something like reverence or
awe about the way they approach you.
21. This is the central thesis of J. S MONS & J. REDmY, THE HUMAN ART OF COUN-
sELiNG (1971), and is explored in J. SimONS & J. REmY, THE RISK OF LovING (1968).
Both authors have had deep influences on me and on many of my students.
22. Brown & Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudence for the Law Office, 17 AM. J. JURiS-
PRUDENC 125 (1972).
1975]
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The facts in these legal decisions are not like facts in courts. Facts
in law-office decisions include feelings such as love, hate, rivalry, and
compassion. The climate tends to be volatile and emotional and to call
upon psychological functions lawyers have not been trained to use.
Jung hypothesized that the vertical thinking-feeling axis and the hori-
zontal sensation-intuition axis are the two coordinates of human inter-
action.28 Lawyers tend to operate at the thinking (what things are)
end of the vertical axis and at the sensation (perception) end of the
horizontal axis. Clients, because they are perhaps less "logical" peo-
ple, tend to operate more toward feeling (not what things are but what
things are worth), and intuition (not perception but insight or, as Jung
said, "seeing around corners"). 24
One consequence of this comparison of the two people in a law-
yer-client relationship is the insight that clients are valuable resources
in the solution of their own problems because clients habitually exercise
functions lawyers do not exercise, or do not exercise as well.25 The
Code bids us to respect these relatively internal, interpersonal, eccen-
tric processes of decision.2 6  Canon Four-confidentiality-helps us
learn what these processes are. Most theology tells us the same thing
because only God can understand another human heart, even when our
interest and God's appear to be the same.
There is more here for a Christian than the normal uncertainty
23. C.G. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 10-20 (1968). The idea of this para-
graph and the next might usefully be put in a diagram:
Thinking
,,(client)
Sensation . ,' Intuition
(lawyer)
Feeling
24. Id.
25. I am uncomfortable about the use of the word "problem" to describe what a
client brings to a lawyer--conscious of Erikson's saying that the trick is not to learn
how to face a problem but to learn how to face a face. See generally E. EDUKSON,
YOUNG MAN LUTHER (1958). The accommodation to recommend between problem-cen-
tered counseling and person-centered counseling is a troublesome one; Hunt, Problems
and Processes in the Legal Interview, 50 ILL. B.J. 726 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Hunt], is helpful and empirically useful.
26. See Code, supra note 7, E.C. 7-7, 7-8. See also text accompanying notes 52-
59 infra,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
and humility in trying to understand another. There is more even than
the respect-unconditional positive regard 2 -that a humanistic coun-
selor hopes to bring to his work. The theological heart of the point
is that God reveals Himself through other people, prototypically
through Jesus, but also through here-and-now other people. At the
same time, every person-not point of view, but person-is a mystery.
A respect for the standpoint of another person, and the consequent
practice of moving from his standpoint to one's own, is a window
into mystery. And "mystery" means
not unintelligibility but inexhaustible intelligibility, for the search
from person to person involved in the process of passing over from
standpoint ,to standpoint reveals each person as inexhaustible, in-
capable of being reduced to a single standpoint or to any sum of
standpoints.28
The lawyer's professional skill involved here is a habit in which "I ef-
fectively hold myself open toward mystery," that is, toward God in an-
other person, and toward the discovery and the deepest value of my-
self.
20
In order to work with my client in this setting, I must be free
to choose an atmosphere of trust. Canon Four turns on trust. In a
functional sense, trust as a factor in a lawyer's professional success
means that the client will "follow his advice"-i.e., will avail himself
fully of his lawyer's learning and experience. It also means that the
client will want a human relationship with the lawyer; he will want,
for instance, to come to see the lawyer again. Trust, in other words,
has a dimension which centers on the problem and a dimension which
27. See C. RoGERs, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 20-22 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as ROGERS].
28. J. DUNNE, A SEARCH FOR GOD IN TIME AND MEMORY 7 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as DuNNE]. Dunne discusses learning about God and about oneself as a matter
of shifting points of view. "No standpoint," he says, "is true in itself."
29. Id. Kelsey, supra note 19, expands this idea in terms of growth. Concern
about a person includes concern about his health and his adjustment to life. Issues of
skill, opportunity, and tactics may follow, but the fundamental issue is concern. This
issue suggests a consequent interest in helping with another person's growth. One of the
central questions in legal counseling is whether change in the environmental situation
is ever useful without change in the person. The law is woven into the client's environ-
ment, but the law also runs deeper. This has something to do with Sullivan's observa-
tion that "for a great majority of our people . . . the stresses of life distort them to
inferior caricatures of what they might have been." One may need to train oneself as
lawyer to notice this pathos and do what he can about it. "Most men think everyone
is getting on quite well but them." Kelsey, supra note 19.
1975]
730 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:721
centers on the person. Research indicates that these dimensions of
trust will be expressed in the client's feeling that he and the lawyer
are making progress, in the freedom of expression the client feels with
the lawyer, in the client's perception that the lawyer is interested in
what the lawyer is doing, and in a free flow of communication between
the lawyer and the client.30 These are the things I find hard to estab-
lish when my client is in the Indiana State Prison.
It is evident, I suppose, that Canon Four exists for the client rather
than for the lawyer, but that observation becomes deep and moving
when the client is seen as a child of God, as a letter of recommendation
from Christ. Then it is evident that trust defines the dimensions and
the purpose of Canon Four. Trust becomes religiously profound to
lawyers when it is seen as a means for them to bring divine compassion
into the world. A theology of legal counseling might suggest that com-
passion (which means "suffering with") is an expression, through law-
yers, of God's concern for clients. One's lawyer self tends to judge
other people, but one's Christian self warns of danger in judgment and
promises redemption in unconditional acceptance. The goal of the law
of which St. Paul speaks, the goal of what Louis M. Brown calls lawyer-
ing, is the administration of innocence.8 1 The Christian idea is that
Jesus brought man to a point of acceptability, not so much by suffering
himself as by agreeing to bear the human lot, whatever it is.32 Christ's
mission of compassion is also the Christian lawyer's mission; it is a way
to justify other men, to declare them innocent, rather than to judge
them. And it is a way, too, to accomplish the even more difficult task
of justifying oneself-of declaring oneself innocent. It is a way to for-
give oneself and get along.33
I. PROFESSIONAL ZEAL
Students in a first-semester law course in professional responsibility
30. Hunt, supra note 25, at 32-35.
31. St. Paul's Second Letter to the Christians in Corinth, 2 Corinthians 3:7-12,
which contrasts the law by which men are found guilty with the law by which men are
found innocent.
32. DuNNE, supra note 28, at 41. Professor Kelsey points out that guilt is a fairly
useless counseling device since most people already feel guilty enough. Kelsey, supra
note 19.
33. C.P. SNow, THE LirT AND THm DARK (1947). Professor Kelsey notes the
significant difficulties in counseling when either party is unable to cope with himself.
Kelsey, supra note 19. One way to analyze that difficulty is to consider it in terms of
the blurred emotional boundaries between the two parties that arise from their differing
role perceptions. See SHAFFm, supra note 16, ch. 7.
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tend to react with surprise, and not necessarily pleasant surprise, to the
image of themselves as lawyers. They discover ambivalence in their
feelings about lawyers, and, sometimes, a bit of fear in the idea that
they soon will be lawyers. One student said to me after several weeks
of study in the Code: "I liked lawyers better before I started reading
this stuff." To know lawyers, after several weeks of pondering our
expressed professional ideals, is not to love them; to consider a lawyer's
life with his clients is not necessarily to look forward to it. These are
ominous thoughts34 which center in a conflict between role and iden-
tity.35 The ability to live through this conflict and to grow in it with
clients may suggest a meaning for Jesus' aspiration to complete the law
in order to give it meaning."' Therefore, for a Christian lawyer to give
meaning to the law, he must pursue the professional life of reconcilia-
tion which St. Matthew's Jesus enjoined upon the lawyers of his day.
This life of reconciliation may require the lawyer to reconcile within
himself the conflict between role and identity. These concepts-con-
flict, role, identity, growth, completing the law, and a life of reconcilia-
tion-suggest some religious reflections on Canon Seven, which exhorts
the lawyer to exercise zeal on behalf of his client.31
A. TiE CONCEPT OF ROLE
If I close my eyes and imagine a lawyer, I expose myself to a role.
If I close my eyes and see me, I expose myself to an identity. And
if I close my eyes and see myself as a lawyer, I expose myself to the
conflict between my role and my identity. The role concept is socio-
logical-seen from the outside in; the identity concept is psychologi-
cal-seen from the inside out. The conflict is existential, of course,
and perhaps best approached in the context of the lawyer acting in the
lawyer-client relationship. The lawyer receiving a client sees his client
34. See Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsi-
bility, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Watson, Responsibility]; Watson,
The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37
U. CiN. L. REv. 93 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Watson, Quest]; Shaffer, Collaboration in
Studying Law, 25 J. LEGAL ED. 239 (1973).
35. J. DONNELL, THE CORpOIuTE COUNSEL (1970) [hereinafter cited as DoN-
NELL], sets out the role and identity research models and uses them in analyzing in-
house corporate legal departments. See Shaffer, Book Review, 46 IND. L.J. 562 (1972).
36. Matthew 5:17-25. Note that St. Matthew's Jesus is the most radical and un-
compromising in the New Testament and is also the most frequently celebrated in mod-
em popular drama-e.g., Godspell and the Pasolini film The Gospel According to St.
Matthew.
37. CODE, supra note 7, Canon Seven: "A lawyer should represent his client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law."
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and he sees himself; he sees his client looking at him and he sees
himself looking at the client. He has expectations of himself and he
knows that the client has expectations of him. In trying to discover
what those two sets of expectations are, he asks himself, "What does
a lawyer do now?" That is the role question.
The American educational process is filled with role-associated
answers to the role question. To explore the dimensions of the roles
assumed by lawyers I created a "role-playing" device for a class in pro-
fessional responsibility. One member of the class was to assume the
role of lawyer, while another was to be a client, and the two "role
played" an interview in the plausible context of our teaching law
office. 38 The class watched the interview on closed-circuit television.
Members of the class acted as observers and commented on the inter-
view. I noted their comments and arranged them into the two
categories which are suggested by the concept of role-the client look-
ing at the lawyer and the lawyer looking at the lawyer.3 9 My notes
revealed that:
(1) Lawyers are perceived as people who:
-are honest and thoughtful.
-know the law.40
-yell at people on the telephone. 41
-tell people what to do.
-control the time and place in which they deal with clients.42
-are all business.
-take over.
-make decisions.
-sit behind the desk.
-pay attention.
38. This was Louis M. Brown's Carl Tonio problem which raised the moral di-
lemma of whether -to assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense. He devised it for one
of his roving-professor excursions into a contracts class at the University of Southern
California Law Center.
39. The students were not asked to comment specifically upon their role-related
observations but merely reacted to a performance while I took notes.
40. See generally Reisman,. Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 30 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Reisman].
41. Arnold: . . . I'm trying to put you in touch, Murray . . . with real
things. Murray (angrily): You mean real things, like this office? The world
could come to an end and you'd find out about it on the telephone.
Gardner, A Thousand Clowns, in Tan BFsT PLAYS OF 1961-62, at 229 (H. Howes ed.
1963).
42. See generally Steele, Physical Settings and Organizational Development, in H.
HomRNsamn, B. BuNKm, W. BURKE, M. GmNEs, & R. LwisI, SOCIAL INTMACTION 244-
54 (1971).
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-are interested in facts.43
-are very careful.
-do battle for clients.
-avoid moral questions.
-resolve moral questions. 44
(2) Clients are perceived as people who want lawyers to:
-give them a sense of security.
-- tell them the answers.
-lay everything out.
-take care of their troubles.
-make them feel trusting and dependent.
These perceptions do not accord precisely with abstract sociologi-
cal dimensions of professional role, but they are congruent. Com-
monly accepted sociological theory views professional role as involving
(1) special knowledge of "the law"; (2) provision of services which
are too complex for a layman to understand or evaluate; (3) clearly
valuable service; and (4) an organized professional peer group which
justifies its franchise by policing itself. The perceptions my stu-
dents generated, and the words they used to describe them, are more
immediate expressions of the role concept than these abstract specifica-
tions.
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ROLE AND IDENTITY
These immediate and conflicting perceptions of role create anxiety in
students and thoughtful practitioners over one's ability to be honest,
thoughtful, knowledgeable, dependable, dominant, attentive, and care-
ful. The anxiety turns on the fact that the lawyer constructed through
these images is not real. What is real is the whole person, a reality
more grand than the subject of a role because it involves aspiration.
This illustrates the distinction between role and identity. The concept
43. J. CASNER & B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY ch. 1 (2d ed. 1969)
contains a model of the property lawyer which explicates this insight. See T. SHAFER,
THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLs AND TRusvs ch. 1 (1972).
44. See DONNELL, supra note 35, on the threat represented by clients who seem to
want moral guidance. Compare id., with WisE, supra note 19.
45. Immediacy in abstracting discoveries about people is a useful and neglected
art. See E. BERNE, GAmEs PEOPLE PLAY (1965). Lavyers often suppose that clients
want result-oriented competence-and, of course, clients do-but research indicates that
clients also place high value on approachability. Both factors are expressed in these stu-
dent perceptions of the lawyer's role. Grismer & Shaffer, Experienced-Based Teaching
Methods in Legal Counseling, 19 CLEv. ST. L. Rnv, 448 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Grismer & Shaffer].
1975]
734 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:721
of role arises from viewing the lawyer from the outside; identity, on
the other hand, is a matter of the lawyer looking out from the inside.
He sees himself as a Student and as a complex Person, and in these
capacities he looks afresh at his Lawyer dimension. All three dimen-
sions---Student, Person, Lawyer, and probably more-are encom-
passed in the notion of identity. This multi-dimensional characteristic
of identity becomes even more complex when the lawyer perceives the
client also observing all three of these dimensions.
Thus, the lawyer-client interaction becomes considerably more
complex for the lawyer when perceived in terms of identity rather than
role. This multi-dimensional identity, like role, is not free from inter-
nal conflicts, some of which have emerged in discussions of professional
responsibility with students. A few can be suggested here.
1. Constant Conflict of Interest
Conflicts of interest for lawyers are both professional and personal. A
trial lawyer who specializes in plaintiffs' personal-injury cases, for ex-
ample, although called to zeal for his client by Canon Seven, experi-
ences a conflict in his relationship with persons "on the other side."
He has many cases, most of which he will compromise; his livelihood,
in fact, depends on the outcome of all of his compromises because the
persons with whom he negotiates tend to be the same from case to case.
A busy lawyer, for another example, is a person often tom between
his life with his family (personal fulfillment) and his devotion to his
clients (professional responsibility). The telephone is a ubiquitous
and tyrannical symbol of that conflict. Lawyers who aspire to the de-
velopment of their resources as counselors are brought into conflict
with the reality of hourly rates, the economic expectations of partners,
office overhead, and the moral entropy represented by time records.
Lawyers in their identity have clear and even unique personal needs, 40
yet they are often frustrated in their attempts to satisfy these personal
needs in their professional lives. The consequence of seeking need
satisfaction in the practice of law is not as congruent with professional
ideals as the aspirations of the Code suggest. Ideals may in fact aggra-
vate the role-identity conflict.4 7 Thus, personal and professional need
satisfaction often creates identity conflicts when juxtaposed against the
exhortation of Canon Seven to exercise zeal on behalf of one's clients.
46. See Lette, Francia, & Strawser, A Look at Lawyers' Need Satisfaction, 57
A.B.A.J. 1193 (1971).
47. See Watson, Responsibility, supra note 34. This aggravation of the role-iden-
tity conflict is commonly experienced by idealistic law students.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
2. Lawyering Self-Image
Aspirations for the law as a social force conflict with the harm lawyers
sometimes seem to cause in people's lives. The portraits which adorn
law school walls-portraits of Cardozo, Coke, and More-are tangible
influences to most law students and to many lawyers. They are not
vapid; they are often not as remote as common cynicism about profes-
sional hagiography supposes. But students are confronted, within days
of beginning their professional Jives in school, with other images-
images of the police-court lawyer who allows the morals of the market-
place to erode his ideals; images of the senior partner who expects his
associates in the practice to produce money for him. Both sets of
images are real and influential, and these images evoke identity con-
flicts in the student viewing himself as lawyer.
3. Personal Self-Image
The lawyer's sense of himself as a person is broader and deeper than
his sense of himself as a lawyer. Members of a discussion group of
four students in one of my legal-counseling courses remarked to one
another that they did not like law students. The entire legal counsel-
ing class along with this discussion group spent two or three hours
analyzing this discovery, resolving the "problem" by establishing the
fact that the people these students disliked did not exist. One way we
reached this result was to establish our own diversity. Each of us was
less law student than other things. We had in our class several artists,
some musicians, a number of parents, many spouses, a gourmet or two,
a couple of skiers, Jews, Christians, atheists, and one physician. In
working this "problem" through in these terms we perhaps convinced
one another that there were no law students left to dislike. Perhaps
we also discovered that what we disliked in each other was a projection
-a part of ourselves we had first cast out, then noticed elsewhere, and
finally come to despise. In a sense, we managed to reintegrate the
law student part of us by deciding to like it after all; what we first exor-
cised and then reintegrated was the role which threatened our identity.
In this way, an understanding of the relationship of our legal roles and
our personal identity was the key to clearing away obstacles to our
working with one another.
4. Vague Models
It is generally true that many students come to law school without
knowing well even one lawyer, and many young lawyers enter the prac-
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tice without knowing well any lawyers but their law school -teachers.
Both facts were true in my case. Idealized visions of Webster, Dar-
row, John W. Davis, and Brandeis are remote. Judges are of question-
able value as models for law students because most of us do not think
of ourselves as judges, or if we do we are, because of it, poorer lawyers.
Although professors inevitably are models for professional conduct,48
they are often inadequate in this regard because they are not in profes-
sional practice; they are not perceived by students as having experi-
enced or anticipated the role-identity conflict discussed here. Women
are particularly victimized by the vague-models phenomenon; none of
the pictures on the law school wall are pictures of women. Few of
the professors are women, and the blind Lady Justice is not a true
woman either. The lawyer as student is faced with the conflict
of becoming a lawyer without a clear idea of how a lawyer behaves.
C. RESULTS OF THE ROLE-IDENTITY CONFLICT
These instances of conflict combine with a traditional bias for academic
discourse in law schools to produce stress, unmet needs, frustrations,
and unclear anticipations. One result of this is a sense in students that
they are being manipulated by teachers; i.e., "I don't know what is hap-
pening to me, but they do, and they are making it happen." The com-
mon condemnation of the Socratic Method in legal education is usually
less a disapproval of a style of teaching than disapproval of secretive
manipulation.49
Another result of these emotional currents is the formation of psy-
chological defenses. In what psychiatry thinks of as reaction forma-
tion, for example, a student avoids the role-identity conflict by shouting
it down. He thereby develops, perhaps, the occupational disease of
lawyer cynicism. He suppresses the conflict in the values presented
to him by a profession which itself has been unable to resolve the con-
flict.
This suppression takes many forms. Teachers of legal counseling
see this in student interviews, when the student playing the "lawyer"
role adopts a "whatever you want" demeanor, and seems to have no
conscience of his own.5 ° Some students profess no interest in consider-
48. See Redmount, A Clinical View of Law Teaching, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 705,
706 (1975).
49. See Watson, Responsibility, supra note 34; Savoy, Toward a New Politics of
Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970).
50. See Shaffer, Estate Planning Games, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 865 (1972).
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ations of moral values. "I only want to learn the law" and "If you don't
have morals by the age of 22, you will never have them" are common
examples.
Others regard conscience as a private matter and insist that stated
rules of professional conduct (which seem to them inadequate and
even hypocritical) are matters of conscience. Conscience, they say, is
none of the profession's business, and it is either not proper or futile
for law schools to require its study. Other defenses involve denial
("Hell no, I'm not worried") or avoidance.
Within the legal profession, lawyers in the "silk stocking" practice
deny these moral conflicts by refusing to deal with the human problems
which present conflict in an unattractive setting, such as criminal de-
fense, divorce, and personal bankruptcy. When moral conflict does
arise in the vaguer and sometimes more subtle contexts in which these
lawyers practice, they cloud it behind the motives and ambitions of
their clients.51
D. THE PATERNAL IMAGE OF THE LAwYER
It is reasonable to suspect that the image lurking behind most of this
role-identity conflict is an image of the lawyer as a parental, dominat-
ing figure-someone who has to know, to do, to tell, and to be respon-
sible for. It is an ironic image when one approaches the Code as ex-
pressing professional consensus among lawyers. Our ethical aspirations
insist that the law is something the lawyer helps his client with, and that
the determination of what to do with the law is for the client, not the
lawyer.52
Lawyers are expected to be expert at finding out what the law
says, but:
In the final analysis . . . the lawyer should always remember that
the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or meth-
ods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not
for himself.53
51. This perception is suggested by experience, observation (see generally E. Sim-
oEL, TBE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964)), and the insightful lawyer fiction of Louis
Auchincloss.
52. CODE, supra note 7, E.C. 7-1:
In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is en-
titled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to
seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.
53. CODE, supra note 7, E.C. 7-8.
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The fact persists, however, that many lawyers see themselves as
telling their clients what to do. Their successors in law schools see
themselves as having to learn how to tell people what to do. The as-
sumption that a lawyer has to be what I have elsewhere called a "wise
papa"1 is perhaps the source of the querulous terror with which a
young lawyer contemplates his professional life with clients. The pa-
ternal image tempts him to dread one of the greatest of his life's adven-
tures, to mistrust the human experience Jesus identified as the source
of his salvation: the experience of enjoying companionship with an-
other person, walking in his shoes, and living in his world.
The case against the paternal image of a lawyer would be difficult
to make if it required an argument against the economic realities of
the practice of law. Law professors tend to attempt this argument, and
consequently they are ignored even when their urging is consonant
with a comfortable material life.55 But research on this point, as well
as reflection, suggests that the parental model of lawyering-the model
I suggest to be the least Christian and therefore the least human-is
also the least profitable.
Douglas Rosenthal interviewed lawyers and clients in a sample of
litigation involving automobile accidents in Manhattan.5" He as-
sembled data from records, from interviews with clients and lawyers,
and from judgments made by a panel of expert trial lawyers. He then
applied his data to a series of propositions about lawyering. 57
Rosenthal employed two models in the analysis of his data. One
model, which he classified as "traditional," assumed that the client is
best advised to be docile and dependent on the lawyer. The alterna-
tive model, which he called "participatory," assumed that the lawyer-
client relationship is collaborative and that the client should be an
active partner. It is the latter model which seems to follow the ethical
54. Shaffer, Models for the Estate-Planning Counselor, 6 INsrvrrm ON ESTATuI
PLANNING ch. 72-11 (1972).
55. See I. CA.LiN, lAwYEs ON THm OwN (1962), for a description of legal
practice which seems to me both joyless and mean.
56. D. Rosenthal, Client Participation in Professional Decision: The Lawyer-Cli-
ent Relationship in Personal Injury Cases (doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1970).
For an elaboration of this thesis in book form, see D. RosENTHAL, LAwYERs AND Cm-
Ecrs: Who'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
57. These propositions involved appropriate client behavior in the relationship, the
quality of professional ideals and practices of the lawyers who worked in the cases, and
measures of professional competence.
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aspirations of the Code and the professional ideals which follow upon
religious reflections on St. Matthew's Gospel. Rosenthal classified the
cases he studied within one or the other of these models, submitted
the cases to a panel of trial lawyers for evaluation, and compared the
panel's figure for monetary recovery in each case with the actual
amount awarded. From this he determined that the participatory
model yielded consistently higher settlement recoveries than the tradi-
tional model. With all this authority-professional, religious, and em-
pirical-the point that it is better to be a companion than a parent is
made perhaps more solidly than other points in this essay. If that is
so, it might be useful to look at more detailed aspects of the two models
employed by Rosenthal.
Under the traditional model, clients are expected to be passive.
Legal problems generally have only one best solution, and lawyers are
seen as more likely to be competent in arriving at it than laymen; the
model assumes that professional competence is a difficult thing to
judge, and that only lawyers can do it well. The traditional model also
assumes that professional service by lawyers is usually competent, that
it is readily available to persons of modest wealth, and that ethical
standards are high and consistently enforced. Fees, according to this
model, should be set by the lawyer, and second lawyer opinions are
not usually advisable."
In the participatory model, clients are expected to be active rather
than passive. It is considered proper for the quality of professional
service to be low at times, second lawyer opinions are thought to be
valuable, and legal problems are viewed as complex and amenable to
a layman's common sense. The participatory model assumes that law-
yers are not often able to be disinterested, that fees should be negoti-
ated, that laymen can judge the quality of professional services, that
the middle class in America is often not able to get good legal service,
and that ethical standards are unclear and, even when clear, not con-
sistently enforced. Rosenthal recorded what lawyer and client in each
case said to him about their experience and placed each case in the
"traditional" or "participatory" column. As might be expected, most
of the cases fell into the "traditional" model, and in those cases clients
felt more oppressed and consistently recovered less money.
58. Similar empirical research generated similar results in probate practice. See
generally M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHErANcE (1970);
Shaffer, Book Review, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 844 (1971).
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Neither Rosenthal nor I believe that the choice of model is neces-
sarily the lawyer's choice. Clients often want to be treated as chil-
dren and resist attempts to make them responsible for them-
selves. A lawyer should insist on a collaborative relationship
with his clients and should terminate the relationship when clients re-
fuse to deal with him on those terms. But the choice of a traditional
or parental model is almost always a shared choice. 59
E. PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE
ROLE-IDENTITY PROBLEM
A change of assumptions in professional relationships among lawyers
and clients will be a formidable enterprise, involving legal education and
the development of new professional skills.6 0
A change of this nature would be a change toward professional
integration-the practice of law in such a way -that lawyer role and law-
yer identity are functionally joined in the law office. The insights of
the Christian religion and the discoveries of 20th-century depth
59. There may be here a subtle question about how parental a lawyer can be in
refusing to be parental. See generally Wisi?, supra note 19, which discusses an anala-
gous problem in professional counseling. Avoidance of the parental approach is the cen-
tral issue on which Rogerian counseling is founded. ROGERs, supra note 27. It is a
rewarding experience to listen to Carl Rogers, on tape or in one of several counseling
films, doggedly avoid the dominant posture in therapy.
Dogged avoidance may also illuminate an exchange between Louis M. Brown and
me on the early draft of Part I of this essay. Brown wrote (Oct. 23, 1973):
There is a distinction between seeking a lawyer's advice and employing a law-
yer to do an act, e.g., file a tax return. The lawyer can keep confidential an
inquiry as to whether an item is taxable income, but after the client has related
facts and made the inquiry, a lawyer who prepares the tax return must report
the item on the tax return. The lawyer has a curiously difficult dual position
which precludes absolute confidentiality.
His observation overlooks another option. A lawyer may refuse to play when the context
is fraud, disabling dependence, or injustice. There are many circumstances in which a
lawyer may not invoke the law against a client. In this respect, we enjoy-or, rather,
the client enjoys-a special license. I am exempt, for the benefit of my client, from
the normal duties a citizen has to assist on the enforcement of the law; I am also privi-
leged to encourage a parental dependence and to countenance inequity. But in each case
I am not relieved of my conscience and my best judgment, and in no case am I relieved
of the ability to refuse to do something I regard as destructive for myself, the client,
or the community. In Brown's example I can preserve integrity and confidentiality by
refusing to prepare the return.
60. The educational answer to the conflict between role and identity is training
in human relations-training which emphasizes the pedagogical relevance of self-aware-
ness and awareness of others. See Grismer & Shaffer, supra note 45. Such training
is an affective enterprise whose curricular principle is that feelings are relevant to learn-
ing. Its professional objective is broadened interpersonal presence, so that both client
and lawyer are more present to one another and more open to one another.
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psychology provide sources of encouragement. Jung talks of personal in-
tegration as a process which requires two people; Freudian psychoanal-
ysis turns on the advertent development of personal dependence; Carl
Rogers and modem non-directive counseling aim at a climate of inter-
personal acceptance essential to counseling;61 and the "human potential"
movement has as its governing dogma the belief that most persons con-
tain within themselves the resources they need to resolve problems of
identity.2 The tenets of all these schools of thought can be presented
rather simply by reducing their significance for legal education to four
basic principles: (1) one's feelings are an essential part of what one
needs to learn about, because much of learning how to be a lawyer is
learning how to be oneself; (2) one needs, for obvious reasons, to learn
about people; (3) one's best resource for learning about people is him-
self; (4) one's next best resource for learning about people, and thus for
learning about himself, is other people.
My frustration in promulgating these thoughts-to students, to my
colleagues in teaching, and to the practicing profession-is that the ar-
,ticulation falls short of reality and seems barren of content. Much of
Louis M. Brown's achievement has been to succeed at giving content
to insights such as these, as reflected both in the substantive law and
in the tangible practitioner's skills legal education talks about. 63 The
following are two illustrative principles suggested by his example.
1. Policy of Settlement
Settlement with one's brother is a modem professional ideal. Al-
though scriptural injunctions against lawsuits have often been used as
injunctions against the legal profession, that criticism of the profession
is not appropriate in modem times. The literature of preventive law,
and other legal literature which does not use that term, accepts as a
modem norm for lawyers what I have given my students as the Third
Principle of the Common Law: "Avoid Litigation." Most legal prob-
lems, even "litigation" problems, are compromised short of the court-
61. SHAFER, supra note 16, compares these theories of integration. See also A.
WATSON, PsYCHrIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968).
62. See generally J. HOWARD, PLEASE TOUCH (1971) [hereinafter cited as
HOWARD]; JAMES & JoNEaFwoRD, BoRN TO WIN (1971) [hereinafter cited as JAmEs &
JoNEG-woRDI; T. HARRIS, rM OKAY, YOU'RE O:AY (1969) [hereinafter cited as HARRIS].
63. See, e.g., L. BRowN, PREvENTvE LAW IN T LAWYERiNG PROCESS (1963); L.
BROWN, MUAI. OF PREVENTIVE LAW (1950). See also L. BROWN, PLANNING BY LAW-
YERS (1967); L. BROWN, ARTICLES ON PREVENTIv LAW (1969); Passamaneck & Brown,
The Rabbis-Preventive Law Lawyers, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 538 (1973).
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house. Lawsuits are preferable to chaos, but they have limited social
utility beyond that. The art of mediation, compromise, and negotiation
are, in this modem ideal, analogues to the knowledge of evidence, civil
procedure, and trial tactics, traditionally considered to be the prereq-
uisites for legal practice. Few in legal education yet regard these arts
-these interpersonal skills-as essential to preparation for practice,
even though many lawyers now grudgingly concede that instruction in
such arts is acceptable as an elective option in the law school curric-
ulum. Most of those who believe in the utility of these interpersonal
skills have come to this conclusion through Louis M. Brown's relentless
influence. These skills turn on an ability fundamental to counseling-
the ability to understand people and to create climates in which people
can call upon their own creative resources. That skill is largely a mat-
ter of self-awareness and awareness of others, which could in itself be
a religious reflection on Canon Seven: zealous representation of clients
requires skills for reconciliation. The aspiration behind Canon Seven
is that clients will, through effective and affective counseling, make
their own-fundamental choices. Mutual respect for personhood in the
lawyer-client relationship gives meaning to the law and to the practice
of law.
2. Interpersonal Skills
Interpersonal skills, often learned inadvertently, are essential to profes-
sional success. Simplifying somewhat the need hierarchy of Abraham
Maslow, R.S. Hunt has argued that clients form global judgments about
lawyers-judgments that transcend the dimensions of the difficulties
clients bring with them.64  These judgments provide answers to two
fundamental questions: (1) do I want to follow his advice? (2) do
I want to come back to him? The first is a problem-centered judg-
ment. Our professional preparation advertently and exhaustively pre-
pares lawyers to respond to the client's concern-by being sharp, ana-
lytical, informed, influential, and articulate.65 The second is a person-
centered judgment; our professional preparation tends to leave its
,resolution to chance, etiology, and the Holy Ghost. And yet, as Hunt
demonstrates and as the Missouri Bar Survey documents, personal rela-
tionship has everything to do with success in the practice and with
success in "solution of the problem."6 6 This latter point is a subtle one,
64. See note 25 and text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
65. See note 43 supra.
66. See note 45 supra; Turner, What Your Client Thinks of You, 29 ALA. LAW.
132 (1968).
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for it is not immediately apparent why interpersonal skills should con-
tribute to narrow success-i.e., to "winning cases." The answer seems
to lie in two facts: (1) most cases are not won in trial by combat, but
are settled through compromise; (2) the ethical practice of law turns
on the lawyer's ability to help clients arrive at essential choices, not
on the ability to make choices for clients.
I suspect that adherence to the letter and spirit of Canon Seven
requires an accommodation of the role-identity conflict. Although pro-
fessional zeal may appear to be in conflict with some personal and pro-
fessional needs and goals, a view of lawyer-client interaction as a
"participating" relationship provides the basis for an accommodation of
professional zeal with these needs and goals. By recognizing the worth
of the client as a human being, the lawyer takes the first step in order-
ing his own needs and goals in a way which will be consistent with the
purposes of Canon Seven.
Im. REFORM
Canon Eight---a lawyer should assist in improving the legal system-
corresponds in a seminal way to St. Paul's great statement on love:
I may have the gift of inspired preaching; I may have all knowl-
edge and understand all secrets; I may have all the faith needed
-to move mountains-but if I have not love, I am nothing. . . . I
may give away everything I have, and even give up my body to be
burned-but if I have not love, -it does me no good . . . [Love
is] patient and kind; love is not jealous, or conceited, or proud;
love is not ill-mannered, or selfish, or irritable; love does not keep
a record of wrongs; love is not happy with evil, but is happy with
.the truth. 67
A. CLIENT PERCEPTION OF LAW
"Law" is an awesome word for lawyers. Holmes scoffed at this awe
when he talked about law as the "brooding omnipresence in the sky."
Nevertheless, the awesome word "law" is to lawyers what "God" is to
the pastoral professions and "health" to the healing professions. In
each case the awe affects the professional and often explains why he
chose his profession.68 Feelings about awesome words also act on the
perceptions which the person seeking help brings to the professional.
67. St. Paul's First Letter to the Christians in Corinth, 1 Corinthians 13:2-6.
68. Feifel, Physicians Consider Death, PROCEEDINGs OF THE 75TH ANNUAL CON-
VENMTON, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 201 (1967).
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The client's own personal response affects his perception of his reason
for seeking help. His feelings, in other words, help to define his
"problem." The personal relationships peculiar to each profession are
therefore substantially related to each profession's awesome word-
even when the human facts which give rise to the "problem" are the
same.09  In each case the mood of the professional relationship will
be affected by the feelings which make it awesome. This may be seen
by three relational charts:
GOD
parishioner astor
HEALTH
patient <healer
LAW
client lawyer
Law seems to be an influence deep in the psyche: be-
yond statutes and cases there is the law within us.7 0  The Freudian
thinks of the law within us as the presence of early attitudes toward
the father, while the Jungian thinks of it as archetypal, as something
in the collective unconscious which traces not only to childhood and
to parents but to the dim origins of the race. 71 Similarly, the Rogerian
thinks of the law within us as a source of punitive self-judgment of
badness or stupidity which makes adult self-reliance difficult. 2  The
transactional analyst73 will say that the law within us symbolizes paren-
69. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
70. This idea, and an unpublished elaboration of it, entitled The Law Within Us,
come from Dr. Robert S. Redmount. See also Shaffer, Some Hard Truths About the
Administration of Justice, RES GESTA , August 13, 1973. A similar assessment of the
source of the law's power is contained in Professor Rodes' conception of "natural law"
as intuitive. Cf. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRIsE, to be published this year by Dunellen
Press, New York [hereinafter cited as RoDES].
71. These philosophies are discussed in SHAFFER, supra note 16, ch. 7.
72. See generally E.H. PORTER, JR., AN INTRODUCMTON TO THmAPEUTIc COUNSEL-
ING (1950).
73. See E. BERNE, TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1961); HARRIS,
supra note 62; JAMEs & JONEGEWORD, supra note 62.
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tal influence, a source of the 'Tm not okay, you're okay" feelings which
disable objective, adult judgment.
All these associations are negative; they all suggest law as op-
pressive authority. These negative feelings coincide with observations
in the literature of counseling which suggest that the person being
helped is likely to have negative feelings about this brooding omni-
presence, at least at first.74 The professional is called upon to create
a climate in which these associations become positive, as a necessary
condition for the client's growth and sense of responsibility. Put an-
other way, the persistence of disabling dependence in the person being
helped is a function of the persistence of negative associations to the
will of God, the threat of death, or the oppression of the law, depend-
ing upon which professional is being dealt with.
There are some alternative ways in which law as brooding omni-
presence influences the lawyer-client relationship, none of which seem
to explain matters as well as does the concept of law as oppressive
authority. One alternative is to perceive law as an avenging force,
rather than as oppressive authority. I suspect, however, that this per-
ception is more likely to come from reading the newspaper than from
dealing with a lawyer. The perception is certainly fundamental to the
law's ability to maintain public order-to be an alternative to chaos-
but, again, that importance seems to be traceable more to a broad pub-
lic demand for redress of evil than to the "solution of a legal problem"
for which a person seeks professional assistance.
The Charles Manson trial in Los Angeles is a good example of
the significance of law as an expression of revenge. From the perspec-
tive of a newspaper reader, that process was a process of revenge-
necessary revenge in the face of the horrors of the crimes of which
Manson and his "girls" were accused-but a revenge which lies deeper
in instinct and intuition than any mere argument for criminal justice.
The prosecutor was a champion. The defense lawyer was an obstruc-
tion-although perhaps a necessary one so that the revenge would be
perceived as "just" by the newspaper reader. The members of the
jury were sources of objectivity; the judge was a representative of the
power of the State; and the defendant himself was almost all projec-
tion: Manson was pure evil. I have never read in the press of anyone
who seemed so clearly to be the devil himself-not even Hitler, who
was always enigmatic as well as evil.
74. RoGERs, supra nlote 27,
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. . In a second alternative characterization, the brooding omnipre-
sence of law might be experienced as security and order-as what
prevents collisions between cars and discourages burglars. This per-
ception seems cordial to Freudian analysis; the law does for me what
my father once did. Clients see lawyers in reference to the law as
protector, but they seem to hold this view only when the protection
of the law is doubted or unsure. One way of characterizing this client
feeling is to say that the client is in some way fearful or skeptical of
the law. Clients seeing lawyers about the law as protector, in other
words, are more like parishioners seeing pastors about the will of God,
or patients seeing healers about the threat of death. There is a nega-
tive or fearful tone to the awesome word.
In another alternative, law might be experienced as unoppres-
sive power-a way to make things happen, to push people around, or,
in Auden's phrase, to trudge on time to a tidy fortune.75 But even
here the law as experienced in a lawyer-client relationship is different.
There is reason to doubt the power of the law-to fear that it might
not assist after all-and that doubt is the reason the client consults a
lawyer. If he were sure of the assistance of the law, he would need
no acolyte to assure it.70  Here, too, the law is oppressive or awesome,
just as the will of God or the threat of death is awesome.
B. LAWYER PERCEPTIONS OF LAW
Complicated client perceptions of law-as something which threatens
even while it avenges, protects, or secures-are probably even more
complicated when seen by the lawyer, whose perspective is deeper and
75. W.H. AUDEN, THE AGE OF ANxmTY (1947). Gulley Jimson, Joyce Cary's
character, had a compassionate simile for law as power which did not oppress the people
who had the power. J. CARY, THE HORSE'S MouTH 63 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
CARY]:
But when I saw them all so serious and reverent, and even the police with their
hats off as if ready for prayer, I said to myself: Don't be a fool, Gulley, they're
doing their best and they couldn't do any better. They know it isn't justice
and they know there can't be any such thing in this world, but they've got to
do their job which is to keep the handles turning on the old sausage machine,
and where would the world be without sausages?
76. "Justice" is not the awesome word here; "law" is. Justice-the feeling of the
word-is more remote and is usually not so oppressive; it is like "love" to Christians.
See note 91 infra. But even "justice" has a special force in the lives of lawyers, a force
laymen often do not understand because they confuse it or combine it with "truth":
I am happy I was given the privilege of meddling with impunity in other peo-
ple's affairs without really doing any harm by belonging to that avocation
whose acolytes have been absolved in advance for holding justice above truth
I have been denied the chance to destroy what I loved by touching it.
W. FALKNER, T"P1 M. ,IoN 363 (1965).
746
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
narrower and perhaps more terrifying. Like the client, the lawyer sees
"the law," but he also simultaneously sees himself seeing the law, the
client seeing him, and the client seeing the law.77 The lawyer's per-
ception is thus more complex than the client's; for him the law may
be alternatively characterized as a solution or a home. 8
1. Solution
Physicians are widely thought to have chosen their profession because
they have an abnormally acute fear of death, psychological healers be-
cause they are moved more than most of us by emotional disturbance,
and clergymen because they experience Graham Greene's kind of dis-
turbing God more than most people do. Watson suggests that lawyers
choose their profession out of an abnormally high need for order and
for orderly dominance-i.e., out of a predilection for verbal aggres-
sion.79 Law is in this sense a solution. To the extent that law tends
to provide solace from anxiety over disorder or unclear expression,
lawyers may revere law rather more than other people do. Law-
yers also experience feelings of awe at the word "law," which many
people, who think of traffic signs and income-tax returns more readily
than of Lord Coke and the Constitution of the United States, do not
experience.
We lawyers turn to "the law" for sustenance; we enjoy a "good
legal problem," a fine conceptual discussion, or an evening of keen
logic chopping. We also enjoy our flirtations with ambiguity. Thus,
in one sense, law is a solution for lawyers who seek to fulfill their need
for order.
2. Home
Law also provides a haven, a barricade, and a status, three ideas which
might be organized under the single heading: Home. Home is a place
to get away to. It becomes apparent that law is being used in this
sense when a judge finds an answer-as Holmes is quoted as saying-
not so that he can do justice, but just so that he can administer the
law. Justice is too vast a concept to be tolerated all of the time. On
most occasions law alone will have to do.
Law serves as a barricade as well. The real estate broker who
77. See text following note 37 supra.
78. Those words are more signals for feelings than they are concepts.
79, See Watson, Quest, supra not 34,
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10 years ago opposed an open-housing ordinance because, he said,
"You cannot legislate morals," may today find it comforting to point
to the same ordinance as a reason for refusing to cooperate with his
seller's racial discrimination. To say "the law requires it" is a way
not to pass moral judgment on the seller; the legislation then seems
not to be an imposition of morals but rather a way to avoid moral dis-
course. Law in a religiously plural society serves this function well-
hence the notion of "neutral principles."' 0 Lawyers often allude to
the law in this sense ('Tm sorry, but that's the law"), and thus find
in the law a barricade against their duty to shoulder responsibility for
the way things are.
Finally, law is, for the lawyer, a status. He is a priest in a mysteri-
ous and respected ritual; people need him, and they respect him be-
cause they need him. He is proud of his status; it is like a mansion
on the hill. s -
C. CONTEMPLATING THE IRRATIONAL IN MAN
It is too simplistic to talk about law in this bifurcated way-law to peo-
ple who seek the assistance of lawyers as distinct from law to lawyers.
Reality is more complex because the omnipresence broods on both law-
yer and client, and its brooding is perceived both directly and through
the other party to the relationship. The force of law in the relationship
in the final analysis is a hard thing to describe, but a few less obvious
possibilities can be suggested.
Law in the relationship is something we use. Law is a sanctioned,
relatively safe way to push people around. For example, the "War
on Poverty" has as one of its most prominent results the development
of legal services for the poor,"2 and in this context law restores a meas-
ure of coercive power to oppressed people. Law to the 19th-century
business baron, on the other hand, was a way to do what he wanted.
To Huey Long law at one time was a source of oppression, then a
source of annoyance, and finally a source of incredible personal
80. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAIv. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
81. See generally Reisman, supra note 40.
He's a lawyer, and to a lawyer, if it aint complicated it dont matter whether
it works or not because if it aint complicated up enough it aint right and so
even if it works, you dont believe it.
W. FAuLmER, ThE TowN 296 (1957).
82. Cf. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.L 1049 (1970).
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power.83 Law as something to be used is also sometimes an excuse;
the traffic policeman says he means nothing personal when he gives
me a ticket. Finally, law may be a sanction for what might otherwise
be seen as shabby; "continuance" sounds better than either "delay" or
"neglect."
Law, in the relationship, may lose its rationality since law some-
times has to be more or less than rational s.8  Analysis of this notion
requires a search for the law-office analogue for Holmes' famous judi-
cial observation that the life of the law has not been logic, but experi-
ence.85  Perhaps it lies in part in E.B. White's complaint that lawyers
never write anything you can read; when you show them a piece of
plain English, they say it doesn't mean anything.8 6 This irrationality
often is evident in the preparation and execution of wills. Clients
rarely read their wills; when they do read them, they profess not to
understand them, and when they are asked to make rational judgments
about the text, they ask, "What do I have a lawyer for?" The lawyer's
work thus is seen as ritualistic; it need not be understood as a rational
act. A less cynical characterization of this perception is that the law
inevitably expresses the history and aspirations of the community and
that these are never wholly accessible to reason.
Legal rationality and irrationality may also provide a useful focus
for the difference between lay perception and lawyer perception of law
as an awesome word. The pretension of lawyers is that they are more
rational, at least in professional matters, than laymen are; it is just as
likely, however, that rationality is just a lawyer's style, and that realiza-
tion of the aspiration of Canon Eight-reform sufficient to assure
citizen respect for law-lies in conforming law to the irrational in man.
Religion is the means most people have used to give meaning to the
irrational in man and to nature, which is grander than human reason.
Therefore, Christian faith may provide a critical element necessary to
fulfill one's responsibility under Canon Eight, and it may support one's
efforts to develop the leadership which Canon Eight demands.
Lawyers are no more rational than anyone else in their use of the
law. For example, an Indiana bar association ethics panel criticized
a member of the bar for his efforts to rationalize the loss of a case
83. See T. WILLIAMS, HUr LONG (1970).
84. See generally W. BARRETr, IRRATIONAL MA (1958).
85. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
86. E. WHITE, THE SECOND TREE FROM TIE CoRNmR 87 (1953).
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by personal attacks on the judge.8 7 The lawyer was not, however,
attempting to behave reasonably. He was explaining a phenomenon
never wholly accessible to reason (judicial judgment), and was im-
properly using a selfish and biased bit of irrationality. He was irration-
alizing something that was partially unrational. Rationalization is not
something lawyers do; it is something they affect. Both lawyers and
clients are often unrational in their lives under the awesome word
law; to put it in a positive way, there is more to people, to life, and
to law, than reason. If we pretend that it is a rational system, our ef-
forts should tell us more about ourselves than about the law.
This is not to deny that lawyers are especially qualified to notice
a need for reform, and to initiate reform, in the law.88  Nor does my
point deny that lawyers should be peculiarly dedicated to improvement
in the legal system.89  Lawyers are best qualified to initiate legal re-
form because they share a greater fascination with the awesome word
law, a consequently larger amount of information on its process, and
somewhat more dependable intuition on what decisionmakers will do
than do lay people. But when all is said and done-in decisions on
questions of law as well as fact-it is quite possible that our lay fellow
citizens may have greater wisdom on the reforms themselves.
Christian philosophy regards love as the key to human under-
standing.90 I doubt that we can learn to respect the unrational in our-
selves, in our brothers and sisters, and in the law, without love.
Rationalization is a lawyer's style and pretense, and thus a way to live
under the shadow of the awesome word law. It is a defense. Perhaps
with love the lawyer can lower his defenses long enough to be useful
to the community. And that, of course, is where the most famous of
the Pauline letters and Canon Eight come together-in the acceptance
of our need to rationalize our need for the law, in our compassion for
the client who experiences the law as oppressive, and in our celebration
of the common and unrational humanity, in both lawyer and client,
which the law expresses, calls to goodness, and protects.
87. INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ANNOTATED 222 (1973).
88. CODE, supra note 7, B.C. 8-1.
89. CODE, supra note 7, E.C. 8-2.
90. I mean nothing fanciful when I use the word; cf. Kelsey, supra note 19:
When we examine ourselves we find that there is an emotion which fits [St.
Paul's] description which we have toward those that we love the most. The
startling thing about Christianity is that we are expected to have this emotion
toward all men.
See St. Paul's Second Letter to the Christians in Corinth, 2 Corinthians 3.
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St. Paul's denial of the relationship between love and evil, and
his celebration of the relationship between love and truth,91 is thus a
religious reflection on Canon Eight. Neither love nor law needs to
rejoice in condemnation. The practice of law can be, as St. Paul else-
where says, the means for finding men innocent, and therefore of find-
ing them good even when-or especially when-they are irrational.92
Law need neither ignore the facts of human nature, any more than love
ignores them, nor oppress relationships. Law's ability to transcend con-
demnation, however, may depend-as love's ability to transcend
depends-on accepting both the rational and irrational in humankind.
Part of the truth within a human being is that much of his deepest
life, a depth the law reaches rarely and lawyers reach often, is not
rational. Improvements in the legal system, our duty under Canon
Eight, will come more quickly if we contemplate this irrational, Chris-
tian-Jewish-Pauline religious reality. In this way Canon Eight is in-
extricably bound up with St. Paul's message of love.
IV. EXAMPLE 93
One surprise we received in our reviving the course in professional
responsibility in the first year at Notre Dame was that students have
refused to regard the rules as rules. They insist on merely consulting
91. 1 Corinthians 13:2-6.
92. See note 85 and text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
93. Canon Eight deals with systems, Canon Nine with personal example. Neither
involves-in the present context-law as a moral guide. It seems hard to avoid the
common sense observation that the law is both an expression of moral consensus and,
in a Sartrean way, an inevitable tutor of morals. See generally RoDns, supra note 70.
Jurisprudes have made hard going of the principle, but it is obvious to me that we make
the law express a moral consensus, at least the moral consensus of our power holders.
And we accord a certain moral authority to law by virtue of its being law.
If that's the law, I reckon there aint nothing for a law-abiding feller like me
to do but jest put up with it. Because if folks dont put up with the law, whats
the use of all the trouble and expense of having it?
W. FAuLKNEa, THE MANSION 29 (1955). See generally P. DEwvN, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS (1955); Levi, The Collective Morality of a Maturing Society, 30 WASH.
& LE L. Rav. 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Levi]. The relevant focus for this issue
in the present context is the lawyer as moral tutor, a point to which Louis M. Brown
has devoted attention. Probert & Brown, Theories and Practices in the Legal Profes-
sion, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 447 (1966-67). Empirical evidence suggests good reasons for
consideration of the question. Lawyers are moral leaders, especially in America, for
good (the "civil rights revolution") or ill (Watergate). See DONNELL, supra note 35.
President Levi argues, in reference to the formation of public policy by judges, that gov-
ernment must be patient about the developing conscience of the people if it proposes not
only to rule but to foster goodness among them. Levi, supra at 430. My point in call-
ing the situation Sartrean is that government fosters moral conduct--chooses to foster
goodness or evil-and cannot avoid doing so. At this point, I think Louis Brown would
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them as situational guidelines. For example, in the case of the divorce
client who left his lawyer and then lied about his residence,0 4 many
students were horrified in class, and persisted into error on the exami-
nations, rejecting the rigid and explicit demands of Disciplinary Rule
4-101(c), which forbids disclosure in any of the three circumstances
noted, on pain of disbarment. A part of the reason for this phenom-
enon in today's law students-and it occurred in relation to other
professional rules as well as to Canon Four-is a rebellion at rigid
moral rules and preference for options in behavior. The broader cul-
ture has come to call this preference an adherence to "situation
ethics." 95  The rebellion of our students seems healthy, and it is per-
haps a reflection of this rebellion that the Code, particularly in its
distinction between Ethical Considerations (aspirations) and Discipli-
nary Rules (minimum levels of acceptable conduct), tries to accom-
modate personal ethical freedom.96
Beyond situation ethics, however, looms a larger theory.97 The
thesis that law is an unfitting metaphor for the moral choices Jesus
talked about expresses the older existential insight of choice.08  I choose,
say that more law is made in law offices than in courts or legislatures, and that moral
leadership of the law, for the most part, is carried out by lawyers in private encounters
with clients. See Reisman, supra note 40. One might then adapt President Levi's point
and suggest to lawyers, as leaders, a patience for the developing conscience of their
clients, without forsaking or ignoring the lawyer's moral influence, achieved through an
ability to see more clearly than the client the tendency and the desirable direction of a
developing moral decision.
94. See text following note 15 supra.
95. See generally J. FLETCHER, SrruATIoN ET-ucs (1966).
96. But in narrow detail these students seek to apply "situation ethics" with a rigor
which the profession will not accept. I will talk here mainly about the idea of moral
options in what I perceive to be my own growth as a lawyer and a Christian, but I
should note that my students disappoint me when they carry perception of options to
the point of rejecting minimum rules of conduct. They seem to me to quibble over and
re-evaluate the trivial; their fault is that they are as mired in rigid morality as the rigid
moralists are. They strain at a gnat (e.g., the legally safe option of keeping silence
when the rules say one should) and swallow a camel (e.g., the failure of their elders
as lawyers to feed the poor, to relieve the persecuted, to bear witness against injustice).
97. See Daube, Pauline Contributions to a Pluralistic Culture: Re-Creation and
Beyond, in 11 JEsos AND MAN'S HOPE 223 (1971), making the point that St. Paul's
purpose in Corinth was to keep a praiseworthy notion from becoming a fetish. The test,
in Professor Daube's view, was whether it was beneficial to the individual Christian to
follow the rule, and whether following it tended to build up others, and the church. This
larger theory is borrowed from James Burtchaell's new book, Philemon's Problem, es-
pecially its third and fourth chapters. BURTC&AELL, supra note 12.
98. "What is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I ought to
know that if I do not choose, I am still choosing." J.P. SARTRE, FMSNTIALISM 48
(Philosophical Lib. ed. Frechtman transl. 1947).
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as Satre said, even when I seem not to choose. I choose by not choos-
ing. In either event, I choose what I am to be.99 In this life of inevitable
choice I make myself into a person who is or is not able to respond
to God.
The purpose of Canon Nine00 is example, but, more than any
of the other canons, it fails to justify itself intellectually. Ethical Consid-
eration 9-6 suggests some possible justifications, but they are little
more than hints:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and
honor of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the
courts and the judges thereof... to act as a member of a learned
profession, one dedicated to public service . . to conduot himself
so as to reflect credit on -the legal profession and to inspire the con-
fidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public. .... 101
The codifiers quote the Illinois Supreme Court in a footnote, but again
the intellectual context is more form than substance:
The lawyer assumes high duties, and has imposed on him grave
responsibilities. He may be the means of much good or much mis-
chief. Interests of vast magnitude are entrusted to him; confidence
is reposed in him; life, liberty, character, and property should be
protected by him. He should guard, with watchfulness, his own
reputation, as well as that of his profession. 10 2
Aspirations of that sort imply a strong, trusted personal reputation and
a respected profession, and they imply that the reason to guard this
position is to assure that the community will be able to grow. But
fulfillment of these aspirations is left to the individual abilities of law-
yers to make the choices of behavior which will make strength and
growth possible.10 3  In this respect Canon Nine resembles St. Mat-
thew's Gospel, where it describes the separation of the sheep and the
goats at the Last Judgment.'
King Jesus spoke of judgment without law. He condemned men
99. See generally J. WILD, ExSmNCE AND THE WORLD OF FREEDOM (1963).
100. "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
101. CODE, supra note 7, E.C. 9-6.
102. People ex rel. Cutler v. Ford, 54 Ill. 520, 522 (1870).
103. Only the narrowly specific injunctions in D.R. 9-101 and 9-102 on conflicts
of interest between public and private functions and handling of clients' money are ex-
ceptions to the self-governance generally accorded to lawyers in interpreting the general
injunction of Canon Nine.
104. Matthew 25:31-46,
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who were surprised to have been condemned-surprised, one sup-
poses, because these men had obeyed the law. When they asked
wherein they had offended, Jesus said, "Go away from me with your
curse upon you. . . for I was hungry. . thirsty. . . a stranger...
naked . . . sick and in prison.' 1 5  They said they didn't see Him
in these moments of distress, and therefore didn't help Him, and Jesus
said, "In so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these,
you neglected to do it to me."'10 One of the most striking things about
that scene is that Jesus did not curse the condemned; He noticed that
they had cursed themselves---"go away with your curse upon you," He
said. They were sent away, not for what they had done, or even failed
to do, but for what they had chosen to be. They had chosen to be
people who could not see God in their brothers. The story compares
interestingly with St. Luke's story of Lazarus and the rich man.107
The rich man was condemned because he did not see the beggar at
his door. He was in hell and looked across the great gulf which
separated him from Lazarus, the beggar, in heaven. The rich man
saw Abraham there and asked him for relief, which was refused. He
then asked that Lazarus be sent back among the living to warn the
rich man's brothers. "If someone comes to them from the dead," he
said, "they will repent."' 08 But Abraham refused to send the beggar,
whom all six brothers had already not seen. "If they will not listen
to Moses or to the prophets, they will not be convinced even if someone
should rise from the dead."'10 9
Christians believe in a God whose love is limitless, and
in a human condition which God Himself was willing to bear. They
believe in a law by which men are found innocent and in a final judg-
ment which is the consequence of what men choose to be.110
What is essential is that [a man] grow to fullest human stature,
-that he become a man who loves heartily. At death time will end,
growth will cease. What ,he has become, that he will remain for-
ever. At death he confronts God. If he is a man who has grown
into love, he will draw near and cleave to him-as he has gone out
of himself to his brothers before death. If he 'has only become
105. Matthew 25:41-43.
106. Matthew 25:45.
107. Luke 16:19-31.
108. Luke 16:30.
109. Luke 16:31.
110. St. Paul's Second Letter to the Christians in Corinth, 2 Corinthians 3:7-12;
John 8:15,
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wrapped up in himself, then he will come face-to-face with -the
Lord, but not notice him any more than he has noticed his broth-
ers.
11
The Christian imperative here seems to be a life of choosing
either to discover and notice the beggar Lazarus at the door or to sub-
mit to creeping penury of trade unionism in the legal profession. 112
Active love, like that of Jesus, is most sensitive, and discovers, without
being told who is suffering, who lies neglected. 113  A person's morality
111. BtRTCHAELL, supra note 12, at 67. See CARY, supra note 75, at 223, 311:
Progress isn't done by governments or spirits, but by chaps. A few rich chaps
gambling on their fancy and a few young chaps backing them up in order to
give papa and mama a shock. It's just the same in art . . . . What keeps
it moving is not a big public shoving its little foot forward, but a little mosquito
biting a big public behind. If you left the world to itself . . . it would die
of fatty degeneration in about six weeks. It would lie down in the nice rich
mudbank where it finds itself and close its eyes and stuff its ears and let itself
be fed to death down a pipeline. But God, not intending to lose a valuable
pedigree hog that way, has sent the mosquito to give it exercise, and fever and
the fear of death.
. . . go love without the help of anything on earth and that's real horse
meat. A man is more independent that way, when he doesn't expect anything
for himself.
Burtchaell also quotes Rose Macaulay, who reflects, on reading the inscription on a
tomb, that sin is a matter of not noticing--"A confused sort of twilight in which every-
thing is blurred. . . because right and wrong have become things you do not look at
.... " until, as Father Burtchaell puts it, "by doing unloving things they had become
unloving, to their surprise."
112. BuRTCHAELL, supra note 12, at 71. Louis M. Brown's wife, Hermione K.
Brown, is a distinguished Beverly Hills lawyer whose moral outlook is vigorous. See
her statement in Brown, Responsibilities of the Taxpayer, 15 U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX INSr.
1, 4, 8,10, 16 (1962):
I'd like to keep from getting in trouble with the authorities and I'm grateful
that there's a way to keep out of trouble. * * * As far as I'm concerned,
there's a real difference between the person who openly takes a position and
one who does it secretly. The fact that the law sets its own sanctions isn'tjustification for surreptitious non-compliance. * * * I feel that everyone
should pay no more than is required, and no less. . . . That's why I support
a competent, adequately compensated Internal Revenue Service. Only through
good government can I be assured others are treated equally. . . . -mt's part
of my overall citizenship responsibility to see that obedience to law is accom-
plished.
113. I leave aside in the text the public thrust of Canon Nine, but not without no-
ticing that the public thrust is rich and important, especially in an era which has recently
seen lawyers in positions both of conspicuous moral rebellion (the "civil rights revolu-
tion," the "war on poverty," and the movement against the military adventure in Viet-
nam), and conspicuous moral decay. Lewis, The Profession of Law, N.Y. Times, July
6, 1971, at 25, col. 1; Ostrow, Matthews, Watergate a Lawyers' Scandal, Chicago
Sun-Times, July 26, 1973, at 60, col. 3; Waltz, Lawyers on Trial, Chicago Tribune, Nov.
18, 1973, § 9 (Magazine), at 32. I have often thought that lawyer roles are usefully
distinguished into counselor, manipulator, advocate, and revolutionary. The last is in
most respects a unique professional calling, and a calling which I find consistent with
the oldest and best in the American legal tradition. Canons Eight and Nine cautiously
invoke this tradition. It is possible also to Christianize it, or perhaps to reassert its orig-
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-his efforts to make himself and his profession honorable and open
to change--defines his existence. In a person's life as a lawyer he
can easily enter upon a course of conduct which seems to involve no
significant moral choices by simply walking down the street and not
looking. He can live unwillingly, as others seem to expect him to live,
and his oblivious, undiscovering conduct will define everything that is
important about him. He will be destroyed by his moral blindness and
will have made himself blind without noticing. It will never have
occurred to him to see.114
The social side of this ethic of choosing a life of discovery is that
decisions which change society are individual and even eccentric." 5r
They are not objectively self-evident. Jesus could have chosen not to
be murdered, Thomas More could have found his way out of the Act
of Supremacy,"" and Dr. Thomas Dooley could have gone on practic-
ing middle-class, domestic medicine. No one could have demanded
of these individuals the life-defining decisions they made, but they
were compelled by the nature of the person each of these men chose
to be.1 7  Senator Harold Hughes chose recently to leave the Senate
for full-time religious work; one can as easily conceive of a religious
worker deciding to run for the Senate. These choices have in common
an import for society (and for professions) and a unique individuality;
that is, they are not decisions of time and mores, but decisions a person
makes in the solitude of his own conscience. They are decisions taken
by one who "cannot expect society around him to be virtuous, so that
his integrity may come easily."""
More's life, in this respect, can be contrasted to the life of his
successor, Francis Bacon. Bacon was probably a brighter man; he had
inal Christianity; I have tried to do that with students by suggesting that it involves (1)
a passion for change, (2) a responsibility (the ability to respond) toward human need,
and (3) compassion (the ability to share suffering).
114. See notes 98 and 99 and accompanying text supra.
115. Witness, for example, the lives of Jesus, St. Thomas More, and Dr. Thomas
Dooley.
116. Robert Bolt saw Thomas More as a man who defined himself through personal
choices. See generally R. BOLT, Preface to A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962) [herein-
after cited as BOLT]. Another thoughtful view of More can be found in Hesburgh, The
Moral Basis of Personal Commitment, 44 NoTRE DAME LAw. 1082 (1969). See gen-
erally R. CHAMrRs, THoMAs MoPE (1935).
117. "All I mean by truth," Holmes said, "is the road I can't help travelling." I
HOLMES-POLLOcK LE m-Rs 100 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
118. BuRTcHAELL, supra note 12, at 97. T.S. Eliot painted a grim alternative in
The Cocktail Party:
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certainly a better education, more money, and more power. More is
a saint, though, and a model unlike any other for lawyers. Bacon is
remembered in our profession as a judge who took bribes. "The
tragedy," I wrote several years ago, "is that Bacon, as the legal profes-
sion sometimes does, fell short of a realizable ideal."119  Today, a
similar shortcoming to that of Bacon can be observed in a legal profes-
sion whose best men are "exclusively in the defense of the powerful,
to the detriment of individuals less powerful and, ultimately, to the
detriment of the entire society."'120
What seems to bind together these instances of failure at example
-those who did not see Jesus in the poor in St. Matthew's Gospel,
Bacon, and the modem American lawyers I think of as Bacon's heirs
-is that they did what everyone else was doing. In every instance
the plea in defense is vitia temporis (everybody's doing it). And in
every instance the moral destination of these undistinguished, unchosen
professional lives is loss of responsibility and even of the ability to re-
spond. This is the estate which is evil. These were the men whom
Jesus judged-who seemed ito have condemned themselves, rather
than to have been condemned. They were unable to respond to God
when God chose to seek response among men, and they were therefore
unable to respond to God in more ethereal garb, when he proposed
to welcome them to immortality.'12
What seems to bind together -the instances of success at example
-Jesus, More, those who saw God in the poor, and those in our profes-
sion today who choose to lead us out of blindness-is the moral habit
Most of the time we take ourselves for granted As we have to, and live on
a little knowledge About ourselves as we were. Who are you now? You don't
know any more than I do, "But rather less. You are nothing but a set Of
obsolete responses.
T.S. ELIOT, The Cocktail Party, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 307-08 (1962).
119. Shaffer, Book Review (of C. BOWEN, FRANCIS BACON: THE TEMPER OF A
MAN, 1963), 73 YALE L.J. 533, 540 (1964).
Some of the intrinsic goodness of a good deed must seep into the motive, and
some of the bad of a bad deed. Keep doing good deeds long enough, and
you'll probably turn out a good man.
L. AuCHINCLOSS, THE RECTOR OF JusrIN 333 (1964).
120. Id.
121. Bolt's More seems to sense the ordinariness of evil in this sense. See
BOLT, supra note 116, at 85.
JAILER (Reasonably): You understand my position, sir, there's nothing I can
do; I'm a plain, simple man, and just want to keep out of trouble.
MoRE cries out passionately: Oh, Sweet Jesus! These plain, simple men!
The point seems almost as banal as the human lives it despairs of, but ordinariness ex-
plains a great deal about dead Jews in Nazi concentration camps and about starving
Irishmen in 1850-more than any amount of calculation or ominous rhetoric.
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of unique choice. These examples of good example are imitable only
in their courage. Their decisions are not imitable because each of
them chose to be somebody whom his society and his times could not
have produced.'22 Robert Bolt said of More that he was "a man with
an adamantine sense of his own self."'123 And of those who would,
in the present historical and social context, decline the opportunity to
be examples-i.e., decline 'to notice something worth bearing witness
over-he says:
[W]e fly from the idea of an individual to the professional de-
scribers, the classifiers, the men with the categories . . . . Both
socially and individually it is with us as it is with our cities-an
accelerating flight -to the periphery, leaving a center which is empty
when the hours of business are over.' 2 4
Bolt's More "knew where he began and left off . . . and . . . at
length he was asked to retreat from that final area where he located
his self . . . and could no more be budged than a cliff.' 2 5
We can, in Bolt's view, yearn for More's sense of selfhood, but
we can hardly yearn for More's self, which was his own. Each of us
has the harder choice of his own self, and each of us is free to choose
against his self. We tend to choose better when we choose with
advertence, and to choose poorer professional lives, and a worse profes-
122. BuRTCHAELL, supra note 12, at 93 quotes Hillaire Belloc:
I think when people come to die it is not so much the memory of good deeds
that can support them as the memory of decisions taken. They are the struc-
ture of perseverance. They are creative. And they are in communion with
the ruling and directive power of Almighty God.
123. BoLT, supra note 116, at xiii.
124. Id.
125. Id. Morton Kelsey, supra note 19, says:
Courage is the determination to continue true to what one stands for even
though everything outside the individual deny what we hold and even when we
are assailed by doubts and uncertainty and revolt within ourselves. Spiritually,
courage is living by the spirit in a world which denies the spirit, in a self which
depreciates and revolts against the spirit.
It is not necessarily an intellectually sophisticated virtue. See generally G. ZAHN, IN
SoLiTARY WrrINsS: T-m LIFE AND DEATH OF FRANZ J.GERSTA TER (1964), for the story
of a modem Thomas More who was also a simple and even simple-minded man. One
senses a yearning, amidst disenchantment with doctrine, for an old Christian spirit in
the American ethos, and I suggest that much of the yearning is for the sort of religious,
moral courage we celebrate in More and Jgerstlitter. Walker Percy's character Willis-
ton Bibb Barrett said: "I unite in myself the new American lewdness with the old Amer-
ican cheerfulness. All I lack is Christianity. If I were a Christian as well as being
lewd and cheerful, I'd be the new Johnny Appleseed." W. PEncy, THE LAST GNmru-
mAN 293 (1966).
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sion, when we choose by not choosing. The important thing about
Canon Nine is that our choices define ourselves and all that is defined
in America by the legal profession.
